Nation Brands Index 2011, U-S-A!

Today, I went to the press conference organized by the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI) to unveil their latest survey, NBI 2011. With the United States being at the top of the list third year in a row, NBI listed a total of 50 countries’ brands. In the table below, you can see the top 10 countries from 2008 to 2011.

As I have mentioned earlier, I have several doubts about NBI as a robust measurement scale. Below, I’ll try to organize my ideas under three headings:

- What is NBI good for? When should NBI be used?

- Why doesn’t NBI measure ‘nation brands’?

- Why is NBI’s understanding of nation brands incomplete (if not entirely wrong)?

Read more of this post

Somalia, you’re welcome!

I, as a research, do not study Turkey. I even don’t do case studies. My current research is more at a conceptual level, where I try to map the current actors and subject in international relations. But thanks to my current government’s perfect understanding of aid diplomacy, public diplomacy, and nation branding; I find myself writing about Turkey quite often. When my PM decided to visit Somalia during Ramadan and take his mustache, family, friends, several businessmen, members of the parliaments, and Turkish celebrities – in short everything the Somalians wanted to see -, I had to write…

Is he really shaking hands with the kid?

Search trends in Turkey, keyword - Somali

As the Google Trends graph on the left clearly demonstrates, Turkey and Turks have always been interested (!) in Somalia and have wanted to learn more about the country through online resources. Similarly, newspapers have consistently (!) covered the situation in the country. In more serious terms, it is obvious that Somalia became an important issue for Turkish public opinion pretty much after Erdogan decided to start talking about the country and the situation. This visit was expected to “[draw] international attention to the plight of the drought-stricken country and Turkey’s leadership in the humanitarian crisis“. Erdogan and his groupies filled up two planes and landed in Mogadishu for a one-day trip.

Turkish celebrities sold a total of '0' albums in Somalia this past decade

When we take the visit at its face value, it does not make any sense. Yes, Somalia is definitely in need of international aid – but what Erdogan did was organizing a publicized high level visit to bring a one-time aid. Given the fact that Erdogan called Somalia a real test for civilization, pledged to re-open the Turkish embassy in the country, got Organization for Islamic Conference on board for more aid, and wanted to improve Turkish image, let’s try to look at this issue from a strategic point of view. This visit creates three different question marks in my minds:

Domestic question marks:

This charity drive is taking place during Ramadan, when people’s religious feelings are at a peak point. It is very difficult to evaluate whether government is taking advantage of this religious environment to get donations. Besides, Deniz Feneri case is still going on – so, charities might not be as trustworthy as they seem to be…

Domestic breaking point:
What about our people?! As I tried to show with the Google Trends graph, we don’t care about Somalia – not even a little bit. We heard about the country in 90s with the UN force, then forgot about it for a couple of years, then remembered with the pirate attacks. Government’s decision to give around $200m to Somalia is very difficult to defend given the fact that there are way too many people in need of such an aid in Turkey.

International question marks:
Now, there are a couple of international issues. Why did Turkey decide to help Somalia? It is not a neighboring country. It is not the only war-torn, poverty-struck country. So, why? Well, two answers come up: religion and oil. These answers give rise to several conspiracy theories: is Turkey trying to become the ‘leader’ of Islamic countries? Or let’s take another step further: is another power (mainly the US) trying to situate Turkey as the leader, is another power trying to access oil resources?

International breaking point:

Turkey, out of the blue, gives lots of money to Somalia – does not address any security issues, does not address any development issues but puts a great show on stage. Can we see Turkey as a credible actor in international arena after this act? I highly doubt that…

Public diplomacy question marks:

Did Erdogan try to gain ‘street cred’ in Islamic countries? After Iran, Libya, Egypt, and Syria; firstly this aid is not enough. Moreover, Somalia was not an important issue in Islamic agenda. Did Erdogan try to lead the West by example? Very unlikely. Several Western countries already have standing aid and development programs and are helping Somalia.

Public diplomacy breaking point

Erdogan’s declared message is ‘Somalia is a test for civilization’ and ‘Turkey will lead aid efforts’. Both statements are false and don’t mean much for the Western or Middle Eastern audiences. Somalia is not the only test for civilization and several countries have been actively helping the country for decades right now. This extravagant visit is not likely to make Turkey a ‘donor’ (and definitely ‘leader’) country in the eyes of the Western audiences. The issue is not ‘hardcore’ enough for the Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, even though I accept that an aid is likely to improve Turkey’s image, this improvement will be quite limited.

Long story short, I hope Erdogan and others with him enjoyed their time in Mogadishu, and took lots of pictures. Because this trip will not generate any more influence than a touristic visit in long term. But well, who knows, we might get another term of temporary UNSC seat thanks to our African friends….

Happy Birthday to AKP and to the New Turkish Identity

I am well aware of the fact that my ‘career’ as a scholar is too short to start re-visiting some of my earlier works. Yet, Erdogan’s speech – which marked the 10th anniversary of AKP (Justice and Development Party) – made me go back to a short rhetorical analysis I carried out three years ago about Erdogan. A blog post is definitely not the place to visit this research. Here, I simply want to discuss my conclusions, state the fundamental rhetorical threats coming from AKP to Turkish identity directly and Turkish soft power indirectly, and take a closer look at Erdogan’s celebratory speech.

Never throw away party flags after an election

My conclusions in 2008, I argue, still reflect the reality. Erdogan symbolizes AKP in person – Erdogan is the party. He uses his personal identity to (i) reflect social values on politics, (ii) create a family analogy within the Turkish society (which is not new in Turkish politics), and (iii) play the ‘victim’ card. His rhetoric is built on conservatism, victimization, and populism. He uses conservative elements, nation vs. state comparison, and victimization stories. When talking about an ‘other’, he uses pressure in forms of majority (i.e. we got 50% of the votes), stability (i.e. remember the economy before 2002), and international consensus (i.e. headscarf is not banned in European countries).

Again, as a student of politics and international relations, I try to stay open-minded about different ideologies, strategies, parties, and people. My political opinion, stance, and beliefs (should) have nothing to do with my studies. However, there are two issues with AKP that I cannot accept, and therefore believe AKP and Erdogan are changing Turkish identity, and highly de-valuing ‘Turkish brand’.

Not rocking the 'stache since 1990s

Issue Number 1: Erdogan’s mustache: Apart from the fact that it looks ridiculous, Erdogan’s mustache clearly states his political, ideological, and religious stance. Mustache has been an important aspect of politics in Turkey for a long time. Turks have been able to identify political allies and opponents through their facial hair for a long time. Erdogan’s conservative democrat (also called moderate Islamic in politically incorrect communities) mustache brings religion into the equation, therefore symbolizes a more coherent community. If you do not accept one of his principles, let it be AKP’s unquestionable (!) record of success or Sunni Islam, you are an outsider. Headscarf is the equivalent of mustache for women. Different religious sects in Islam wears the headscarf in a different way. Therefore, all individuals are able to identify and label each other when they meet.

So, what is the problem with that? Well, AKP is surrounded by a community that is coherent in terms of religious beliefs and political ideology. They are clearly labelled by mustaches and headscarves. Outsiders can be identified instantly. (By the way, here is a great post by Ali Erol on how outsiders are defined by insiders – in Turkish).

Baykal, where are you? Call us

Issue Number 2: Redefining the terms: Let’s face it, AKP never faced a ‘serious’ political opposition in Turkey (Also, one might argue that several court cases such as Ergenekon, and Balyoz, as well as numerous personal cases brought to court by Erdogan, and the fact that Turkey has the highest number of journalists in jail might have an impact on this lack of opposition). Within this framework, Erdogan and AKP have redefined several terms in Turkish political parlance. Let me highlight a couple of points from yesterday’s speech.

First of all, the 10th year celebration take place during an ‘Iftar’ dinner of twenty thousand people. Therefore, it is not surprising to find religious references in any given speech. However, following points should be noted:
 

Role of Turkey in bigger picture:

Her zaman zayıf olanın yanında olan milletimizin kalbi, Somali’deki kardeşlerinin yanındadır.
Our nation’s heart, that has always been with the weak, is with its brothers in Somalia.

Somalia is our newly found brother, and Turkey is expected to help developing countries. There is nothing wrong with being a contributor in development projects. On the contrary, it is a desirable position for Turkey within the international arena. Yet, given the facts that Turkey is sending ‘aid’ (prepacked food and other materials) to an Islamic country during Ramadan and that donations have been asked with Ramadan-themed commercials, Turkey seems to be aiming for a ‘protector of Islamic nations’ role.

Our ‘history’

Ama unutmayın o cehalet döneminde bile kimse kimseye kurşun sıkmazdı….Biz şuanda ramazan için sabrediyoruz ama ramazandan sonra bu barış işini tekrardan görüşürüz.
Don’t forget, even during the era of ignorance, nobody fired…We are not doing anything during Ramadan, but after Ramadan we will talk about this peace business again.

As the Turkish nation, we are expected to draw our ‘historical’ lessons from the history of Islam in the Arab peninsula. Ramadan seems to point to an important reference point even in military operations. Thus, if one claims that contemporary Turkey can be seen as the continuation of an Islamic-Arabic tradition, he or she won’t be absolutely wrong.

What makes us a nation?

Zaten İmralı’daki Kürtlerin dininin Zerdüştlük olduğunu ilan etmişti. Acaba Kürtlerin dininin Zerdüştlük olduğunu kabul eden kaç tane bana Kürt kardeşimi gösterebilirsiniz?…Ben inanıyorum ki benim Kürt kardeşlerimin tamamına yakını İslam diyecektir.
The one in Imrali (referring to captured head of PKK, Ocalan) have declared Zoroastrianism as the religion of the Kurds. I wonder how many Kurdish brothers of mine you can show me who will agree that the Zoroastrian religion of the Kurds?…I believe almost all of my Kurdish brothers will says Islam.

While talking about terrorist movement in Turkey and autonomy claims, Erdogan refers to religion once again. Kurds and Turks should live together, as both believe in Islam.

Us vs. Them, State vs. Nation

Milletvekili olabilme hakkım engellenirken, milletimiz bütün karanlıkları aydınlatmak üzere ışıkları yaktı.
When my right to become a deputy was blocked, our nation hit the lights to illuminate the darkness.

Even though nearly a decade passed since the Assembly solved his problem, Erdogan comes back to the fact that he was not allowed to be elected back in 2002. However, he continues to ignore a contemporary problem of similar nature – for instance, there are two deputy-elects from CHP, one from MHP who are still in jail without any indictment. There are five more independent Kurdish deputy-elects in jail from other legal cases. Hatip Dicle, another Kurdish independent deputy-elect was stripped of his rights, and his seat was given to AKP. Therefore, the contradiction is not necessarily between the will of the nation and the bureaucratic structures of the state. It is between us vs. them. Erdogan was one of ‘us’, therefore nation sided with him against state. But these nine deputy-elects are ‘them’, therefore regardless of their situation, nation should not side with them. Hatip Dicle and other deputies might be considered ‘other’ because of their religious views, and ethnic background. Haberal and Balbay of CHP, and Engin Alan of MHP are ‘them’ because they do not share the same political ideas. As I tried to argue, you need to have the same ideas, beliefs, and ideologies with Erdogan to be one of ‘us’.

And finally, I can come to public diplomacy, nation brand, and public diplomacy part. Turkey’s ‘selling point’, so far, has been the bridge between the East and the West. Turkey is versed in the East and in the West. Consequently, Turkey is able to understand both sides and transfer messages. The impacts of this brand has been observed in Turkish diplomatic affairs, foreign military deployments, and public diplomacy attempts. After this swift change of identity, Turkish brand right now is not credible, is not stable, and belongs predominantly to the East. Turkish public diplomacy attempts targeting Western audiences will suffer, as they face the threat of being seen as too ‘foreign’. Eastern audiences might ignore Turkish messages, given the lack of stability and credibility. Even though Erdogan wants to take the role of protector of Islamic nations, he failed to do so in Egypt, Libya, and largely in Syria.

Long story short, in 10 years, Turkish identity and the majority of political terms in Turkey have been re-defined. In 2002, Turkey was a country which stood equally close to the East and the West. Right now, we stand far away both from the East and West.

New publication – Thinking about place branding: Ethics of concept

As you might already know, Journal of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy is publishing a special issue on Ethics of Place Making . My article, entitled “Thinking about place branding: Ethics of concept” will be published in this upcoming issue.

Here is the abstract:

This article introduces a critical theory-induced approach to the concept of place branding to expose the ethical drawbacks within the field. The author argues that the dominant approaches and definitions of place branding limit the thinking of scholars to market-driven subjects, such as measurement, effectiveness and strategies. It is difficult even to discuss ethical issues at a conceptual level within these approaches. With an attempt to further investigate these widely ignored issues, place branding is redefi ned through a communicative action framework, and a two-step model of place branding is devised – composed of domestic communicative action (Step 1) and international communicative action (Step 2). Step 1 highlights (i) legitimacy and (ii) inclusion as ethical concerns, whereas Step 2 brings in the question of (iii) consistency between the messages in the domestic and international arena. Critical theory makes it possible to take an analytical look at the mainstream approaches and present ethical issues at the conceptual level. Future studies should aim to integrate this theoretical approach to the practice of place branding.

I will share the link to the publication as soon as it becomes available online.

Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Identity: Another Term for AKP

Last year, I wrote a short post about Turkish public diplomacy where I practically claimed AKP and Erdogan were the biggest obstacles to a robust PD strategy. Yesterday, AKP won its third consecutive elections, and will be governing the country for another term. And I still have the same concerns about Turkish PD.

Another AKP Victory: the End of Turkish PD?

Another AKP Victory: the End of Turkish PD?


After reading Ibrahim Kalin’s article on Al-Jazeera English, I realized I should write something once again Turkish PD, soft power, and Turkish identity. To be as ‘objective’ as possible, let me reiterate my political position. Kalin is an advisor to the Prime Minister, is very close to the inner circles of AKP. I, on the other hand, personally label myself as a liberal democrat and belong to a “radical secularism and pro-establishment stance” camp in Kalin’s parlance.

Radical Secularism's gonna getcha! (Image from http://cartoonscaricatuer.blogspot.com/)

Radical Secularism's gonna getcha! (Image from http://cartoonscaricatuer.blogspot.com/)

Kalin says that “AKP came to power at the end of 2002 and has since then implemented numerous political and judicial reforms, boosted the Turkish economy, and expanded foreign policy.” The economy is boosted with short-sighted reforms and is transformed into a ‘cash’ economy. The expanded foreign policy moved Turkey away from the Western world. The political and judicial reforms caused question marks about the objectivity, fairness, and even capabilities of several organizations. In other words, pretty much like every move in the social world, there is an opportunity cost to every administrative change. So far, the burden of all these opportunity costs have been on pro-secular, urban, educated population (also known as the middle/upper middle classes). I am not arguing what they do was completely wrong. I simply say that they way the reforms are presented do not, in any way, reflect the reality.

AKP still wants to change the constitution as it is “[..]an outdated constitution and cannot meet the demands of Turkey in the 21st century.” (Before I say anything, Americans – come on, a constitution over 200 years old? Really? And no changes since 1992? Will you drive a 92 model car? Time for a new constitution…). There are several ‘shortcomings’ of the Turkish constitution. I am pretty sure you won’t find more than a dozen people defending the current constitution. Yet, as we have witnessed two years ago, AKP sees constitution as inherently a party-politics based document and instead of drafting articles to meet the needs of Turkey, accuses everyone in the opposition of being pro-establishment and/or radical secular. Constitution is the supreme law, is a contract between the state and the citizens. I do not believe a PM who doesn’t know anything about gender equality and believes that men and women cannot be equal, who thinks it is okay to tell people how many kids they should have, who sees it within his powers to tell people to quit smoking by taking their packs can do this job. I’m sure that Erdogan believes he can, as he once summarized the powers of his office to an elementary school student by claiming that as the prime minister (for a day), she can hang and she can cut, because she has the authority.

Lastly, Kalin talks about “the polarisation of Turkish society over key political issues”. Turkey is not polarized over key political issues. Thanks to Erdogan’s rhetoric, we are polarized over anything and everything! As a rhetoric scholar identified Erdogan’s doctrine in a blog post, you have to choose your side! You either support AKP and its policies, or you are evil.

So, how are all these domestic issues related to soft power, public diplomacy, and identity? There are three main problems:

1) We forgot what democracy is. Under AKP governments, democracy is deduced to voting – actually to voting for AKP. If you vote for AKP, you are a good democrat. If you vote for someone else, you are a bad democrat, and should be grateful that AKP is a forgiving institution, they will tolerate you. Kalin said “Turkish voters have renewed their confidence in Prime Minister Erdogan and his rule in the country” and ignored all the demonstrations and protests against him. Because at the end of the day, voting is the sole tool to voice your opinions in AKP-land democracy. Unfortunately, the current generation will grow up without learning what democracy is – just as we grew up without understanding what being politically active means.
2) Opposition is a sin in Turkey. Kalin used a great sentence to summarize AKP-esqu thinking: ‘despite the opposition of the army and the opposition parties CHP and MHP’…. Despite the opposition of the opposition parties. I just assumed by definition opposition parties are there to oppose, but opposition is never welcomed. The most recent instance was the death of Metin Lokumcu, a retired teacher who lost his life during an anti-Erdogan protest due to the excessive use of tear-gas. PM Erdogan explicitly and implicitly told us not to feel bad about Metin, and to think about a police officer who got injured.

A retired teacher Metin Lokumcu who protested Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, chairperson of AKP after his meeting in Hopa in Artvin lost his life.

A retired teacher Metin Lokumcu who protested Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, chairperson of AKP after his meeting in Hopa in Artvin lost his life.

3) What is Turkey? What is a Turk? This is definitely not an ethnicity question. What I’m trying to say is we are losing the image of a modern democratic Turkey and Turkish citizen. Turkey is happy with the image as “an island of stability” in the Middle East. Our PM thinks it is okay to say ‘Is she a woman or a girl, I cannot tell’ about a protester. Public demonstrations, or call to public gatherings for the opposition parties, are officially ridiculed.

Is this a real mustache or not? I cannot tell...

Is this a real mustache or not? I cannot tell...

Long story short, AKP and Erdogan’s Turkey is a ‘not-so-Middle Eastern’ Middle Eastern country, and Turkish citizen is a prayer/worker/voter male or a prayer/mother/voter female. Indeed this image might be beneficial for PD project towards the Middle Eastern countries in short term. But in the long term, the political oppression and move towards the Middle East are likely to backfire, and utterly destroy Turkey’s image as a modern democracy, and Turkish people as ambassadors showing the compatibility of Eastern and Western values.

PS: I hope I don’t get sued for this post (or for my comment about Erdogan’s mustache)

This post is published also on Place Management and Branding blog.

Turkayfe.org on the Road: Events in New York and DC

Last year, after the Turkish festival in DC, I wrote about the importance of “creating a real community” for online social diplomacy projects. There is, indeed, an undeniable need for ‘real’ people and connections to support online communication attempts. Therefore, as the Turkayfe.org team, we are doing our best to reach out to as many people as possible.

This summer, we are hosting two events, one in New York (June 11th) and another in Washington, DC (June 15th) to discuss the past, present, and future of Turkish coffee. So, if you are in town – stop by one of our events, grab a cup of coffee and join the conversation! Looking forward to seeing you all!

New York, Schedule, June 11th

Address: Turkish House, 821 United Nations 8th floor New York City, NY 10017
RSVP Link: http://turkishcoffeeculturenewyork.eventbrite.com
7:00 PM Event start time
7:15 PM Opening remarks
7:30 PM Ercüment Ackman, Capstone Advisor, Georgetown University Real Estate Graduate School – ‘Once Upon a time Turkish Coffee’
7:45 PM Göknur Akçadağ, History Expert Assistant Professor – ‘The American Perspective: Turks in the 19th – 20th centuries’
8:00 PM Gizem Salcigil White and Efe Sevin, Founders of Turkayfe.org – ‘Digitalizing Coffee Houses – Social Diplomacy Web 2.0 and Turkey’s International Digital Coffee House’
8:30 – 9:30 PM Reception

Washington, DC Schedule, June 15th

Address: Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, 2525 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington D.C., 20008-2826
RSVP Link: http://turkishcoffeeculturewashingtondc.eventbrite.com
7:00 PM Event start time
7:15 PM Opening remarks
7:30 PM Ercüment Ackman, Capstone Advisor, Georgetown University Real Estate Graduate School – ‘Once Upon a time Turkish Coffee’
7:45 PM Göknur Akçadağ, History Expert Assistant Professor – ‘The American Perspective: Turks in the 19th – 20th centuries’
8:00 PM Gizem Salcigil White and Efe Sevin, Founders of Turkayfe.org – ‘Digitalizing Coffee Houses – Social Diplomacy Web 2.0 and Turkey’s International Digital Coffee House’
8:30 – 9:30 PM Reception

Blog Updated: Dissertation Time

As you might have realized, I haven’t been writing any blog posts lately. It is mostly because I started writing subject-based posts on Place Management & Branding blog and didn’t want to cross-post. I decided to keep writing about more current practical events on the PMB blog and save this blog for more theoretical, methodological, and method discussions. In other words, I will be using this blog as a ‘draft’ for my dissertation – which will be hopefully about the use of soft power in international relations.

The subject is not solely ‘branding’. However, my focus will be on branding. I will try to assess whether the recent changes in international relations are, well, changes or not. Did all these discussions on place branding, public diplomacy, soft power, etc. change the way we conceptualize international relations? Or is social media practically the communication version of an ICBM?

Long story short,
- Interesting place branding posts: Place Management & Branding blog
- Public diplomacy, politics, Turkey related posts: Reaching the Public
- Technical / methods-oriented posts: Again, Reaching the Public

What is PD again? Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Meeting

Image from Heritage.org

On Thursday, I attended the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy’s public meeting with a couple of colleagues from AU. Both Lena and Laura blogged about their impressions. And right now, I feel obliged to do the same. The transcript of the meeting will be available online soon (Follow @mountainrunner for more information), so I’ll keep my post considerably short.

First of all, this was Matt Armstrong‘s first public appearance as the Executive Director of the Commission (Congratulations once again Matt, and nice to finally meet you in person!). He has been a prominent figure in strategic communication within both academia and blogosphere. He talked about some planned changes in how the Commission works. Apparently, the Commission will be more open, and will initiate dialogues with think-tanks, universities, and other interested parties. (They will also be publishing white papers!)

I realized the practitioners and scholars of public diplomacy have one thing in common: no one knows what is really going on. Betsy Whitaker from the R, in her presentation, mentioned that other agencies and departments have public diplomacy budgets but the R is not sure what they are doing or even whether the budgets are still spent on public diplomacy attempts (or moved to public affairs). Well, both practitioners and scholars know public diplomacy is important, we have to do/study public diplomacy – and we do. But, please, don’t ask about the details, it gets fuzzy.

The second presentation was from BBG. In Jeff Tremble’s presentation, BBG seemed much better than I thought they were. I mean, my personal interaction with BBG is limited to VoA Turkish. To be honest, VoA Turkish does not have high quality programs. But BBG seems to be aware of what is going on and is capable of using several technologies to reach out to as many people as possible. For some reason, during the entire presentation, I questioned whether BBG is actually doing a great job or just knows how to deliver great presentations… I still do not have a clear answer. But US seems to be doing its best to reach ‘populations deprived of free flow of information’ through BBG.

Yet, I am quite optimistic about the future of American public diplomacy. Even though, during the last decade, the Commission and BBG pretty much talked about the same things (budget, inter-agency cooperation etc), I believe Matt Armstrong is an invaluable addition to the US bureaucracy. The R is aware of its shortcomings, (and the shortcomings of public diplomacy FSOs), and is creating new institutions and programs to increase its effectiveness. BBG is devising region-specific policies, and increasing its technical capabilities. If for nothing else, US is one of the few countries that publicly discuss what to do about public diplomacy, and right now has Matt Armstrong working for the government!

Anholt on Turkey

Simon Anholt announced that Turkey should focus on its ‘nation brand’, a couple of weeks ago in an interview with a Turkish daily newspaper. Back then, as the Turkayfe team, we used the news on our newsletter, and put his statements in some of our materials. More recently, Nation-Branding.info picked up the news , and we are running through a second cycle of viral distribution. In the first cycle, I refrained from commenting on Anholt’s views – mostly because we used the interview to support our project – Turkayfe. Yet, I believe I can put my two cents in during the second cycle.

I want this sofa (Image from Nation-Branding.info)

Let me first extract main points from his interview. The points below are directly taken from Hurriyet Daily News article:

- Turkish government must develop policies to improve the “brand” of the nation:

Now, on one hand, this is an important statement. It is nothing new, fairly obvious to anyone who has any idea of international arena in the 21st century. But, Anholt used this statement in a national newspaper (actually English version of a Turkish newspaper). On the other hand, he puts the responsibility of brand-making, if you will, to the governments. As we know from his various books and speeches, he supports the idea of all-exclusive, (i.e. public-private partnerships) brand creations. However, it seems like the governments have a leading role in his conceptualization of nation-brand. I assume, it is because he equates nation brand with what a country does. Yet, we should stop and think about moral and ethical implications of making governments the primary responsible party for nations’ brands.

- Turkey has to find ways of making itself “indispensable” to other peoples:

Again – pretty obvious but great to read it in a newspaper. This statement (together with his metaphor of the celestial keyboard) raises questions about Anholt’s understanding of international system. Is he talking about a closely-linked global economy? Or about a Global Village? Global politics? I mean, what is indispensable? So, is a good ‘brand’ something that people cannot live without? Is it just this necessity bound? I like to think a brand more in terms of a network of associations – which cannot be reduced to necessity.

- Turkey’s best chance to increase its reputation in the world is “to be the bridge between Europe and Asia, between Islam and other religions:

Well, this has failed so many times in the last few decades, I don’t know what to say about it… It has been used by government officials since the very early days of the Republic – never worked. It usually ended up making Europeans suspicious as ‘we are a Muslim country’ and Muslims suspicious as ‘we are a Westernized country’.

- “Nation branding”..[is].. not about communication or promotion, but concrete policies:

Well, no. I highly appreciate Braun & Zenker’s* definition of place brand as a “network of associations in the consumers’ mind based on the visual, verbal, and behavioral expression of a place, which is embodied through the aims, communication, values, and the general culture of the place’s stakeholders and the overall place design”. Therefore nation branding is about communication and promotion. Actually, if we are looking at nation branding as an integrated process of creating and disseminating a brand identity; ‘nation branding’ part is predominantly communication. Turkey has to change the expressions of the country, through communication as well as concrete policies (and communicating these policies).

One interesting thing about Anholt’s Nation Brand Index and Turkey is that the country is fairly consistent across the six criteria. For instance, Egypt, which shares similar scores with Turkey, has a higher rank in tourism. However in order to talk about the causes for this consistency, one has to accept that NBI’s methodology is valid and reliable. So, I will just say this is an interesting point that might be used as a conversation starter.

In sum, Anholt’s public interviews, speeches, or even books do not provide readers/listeners with ground-breaking information, however, (i) it is great when the most prominent person in the field says these things, and (ii) it is nice to have them in one book. His comments about Turkey are generic, as this is a newspaper interview. His comments about communication and nation branding is based on an assumption that communication is about false information, spins, and manufacturing identities. Yet, ‘branding’ is an attempt to socially and communicatively adjust to living in today’s brand-era. It is a necessity to negotiate what a place means for target audiences with target audiences. It is not about concrete policies, it is about being a part of the global society.

*Braun, E. and Zenker, S. (2010), “Towards an integrated approach for place brand management”,
paper presented at the 50th European Regional Science Association Congress, Jonkoping.

Practice-Focused Theoretical Approach in Place Branding

As a doctoral student, I spend most of my time in the world of theory. In conjunction with my last post, I want to discuss what a practice-focused theoretical approach can do in place branding. And yes, I made up the term ‘practice-focused theoretical approach’.

Let me try to explain what I mean by the term. Again, as a disclaimer – I am in my third year of my graduate studies. Therefore, it is very difficult for me to talk about anything without referring to a theory. Why?

  • A theory describes your ontological and epistemological stance. In ‘smaller’ words, when I use a theory, I actually tell my audience what I think about reality and how I can make sense of that reality.

    So, what is a place brand? Is it something objective that can be reach? Do we have a list of ‘must-have’s for an attractive place brand? Or is it case-specific? Does it depend on what people think about a place?
    Similarly, what is place-branding? Is it trying to complete a list of ‘to-do’s? Is it communicating with foreign publics?

    How do we measure the brand of a place? Based on what we understand from place brand and branding, we should be able to come up with measurement criteria. If our understanding of a place brand is based on substance, our measurement cannot be based on perception. (And we also should not claim nation branding does not exists when our measurement scale is inherently flawed.) (And by we, I mean Simon Anholt.)

  • A theory, then, tells us how to approach a subject. Our conception of reality guides us when we are in the field. If we don’t know what place branding is, we cannot engage in the practice. Even if we do so, our practice will be based on our prior experience. This is why several marketing and public relations firm try to come up with branding projects that are solely based on logos and slogans.

    What should I look at when I am in the field?
    What should I do to improve the ‘brand’?

    I try to introduce a critical-theory influenced approach to place branding and define the term as “a communicative action process in which legitimate actors engage in speech acts to reach a common understanding of a place”. This definition has its roots in Habermas and even to an extent Weber. I discuss how actors claim legitimacy, structure communicative action, make claims, and engage in ‘constative, regulative, and expressive’ acts. Yet, my ultimate goal in these discussions is to reflect on practice.

    Here are some of my ‘academic’ conclusions:
    - A place brand is created with an intersubjective relationship between a speaker and the audience.
    - Creation of a brand and its communication are interactive.
    - Place branding takes places in a political environment where power and legitimacy are fundamental concepts.
    - Legitimacy is a sociologically relative term, and should be negotiated in every step of the social action.

    One of my projects is based on this understanding of communicative action. We believe that a brand is an intangible and social constructed phenomenon, therefore a branding project should aim to intervene in the construction of the place image by the audience. Communicative action is based on a cooperative deliberation process. Therefore, the audience should be able to negotiate the meaning of the place with the speaker with the ultimate aim of reaching a common rational understanding of the place.

    And the end product is….a website – Turkayfe.org. Long story short, theory does not necessarily complicate the social life for us. On the contrary, theoretical approaches simplify the reality to be analyzed more easily. Big theoretical studies are not confined to academic journals. If we can have a ‘practice-focused theoretical approach’, in other words use theory to come up with better practices; (a) we will have more robust projects, (b) we will have be able to craft better strategies.

    PS: If you are interested, here is an article I wrote with Gizem about Turkayfe:
    Sevin, E., & White, G. S. (2011). Turkayfe.org: share your Türksperience. Journal of Place Management and Development, 4(1), 80-92. doi:10.1108/17538331111117188

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